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Contingent valuationHow do people value environmental resources? To estimate public valuation of natural resources, researchers
often conduct surveys that ask people howmuch they would be willing to pay to preserve or restore threatened
natural resources. However, these survey responses often elicit complex affective responses, including negative
reactions toward proposed destructive land uses of those resources. To better characterize processes that under-
lie the valuation of environmental resources, we conducted behavioral and neuroimaging experiments in which
subjects chosewhether or not to donatemoney to protect natural park lands (iconic versus non-iconic) frompro-
posed land uses (destructive versus non-destructive). In both studies, land use destructiveness motivated sub-
jects' donations more powerfully than did the iconic qualities of the parks themselves. Consistent with an
anticipatory affect account, nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activity increased in response to more iconic parks,
while anterior insula activity increased in response tomore destructive uses, and the interaction of these consid-
erations altered activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). Further, anterior insula activity predicted in-
creased donations to preserve parks threatened by destructive uses, but MPFC activity predicted reduced
donations. Finally, individuals with stronger pro-environmental attitudes showed greater anterior insula activity
in response to proposed destructive uses. These results imply that negative responses to destructive land uses
may play a prominent role in environmental valuation, potentially overshadowing positive responses to the en-
vironmental resources themselves. The ﬁndings also suggest that neuroimagingmethodsmight eventually com-
plement traditional survey methods by allowing researchers to disentangle distinct affective responses that
inﬂuence environmental valuation.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
How do people value environmental resources? Policymakers and
researchers have long debated how to best assess the value of environ-
mental goods (Carson et al., 2001; Diamond and Hausman, 1994;
Portney, 1994; Sen, 1995). Much of the value that individuals derive
fromnatural resourcesmay lie outside the traditional bounds of the eco-
nomicmarket. For instance, people often assign “existence value” to the
preservation of a rare species or distant national park, even when they
may never directly encounter that animal or place (Carson et al.,
2003). Though assessing these nonmarket values can prove challenging,
these additional considerations can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence policy and
legal decisions, such as compensation for environmental damages.
Since most individuals do not personally purchase or manage envi-
ronmental resources, researchers have traditionally used surveys to es-
timate the value that the public places on those resources (Diamondson@psych.stanford.edu
. This is an open access article underand Hausman, 1994). For instance, widely used contingent valuation
surveys (such as those conducted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil
spill) ask people how much they would be willing to pay to prevent
the loss of environmental resources or to repair existing damages
(Sen, 1995). Responses to these contingent valuation surveys, however,
may reﬂect affective reactions to speciﬁc situational details (Kahneman
et al., 1999), overshadowing valuation of the resources themselves
(Diamond and Hausman, 1994).
Extensive research has demonstrated speciﬁc and seemingly irratio-
nal biases that can occur during contingent valuation, including “protest
zeroes” inwhich respondents refuse to put any price on a threatened re-
source (Mitchell and Carson, 1989), and “scope insensitivity” in which
scaling the quantity of the resource has no impact on its valuation
(Hausman, 2012). Environmental economists have noted that individ-
uals often seem to base their willingness to pay for a natural resource
on the severity of threats to the resource (such as an oil spill), rather
than the value of the resource itself (such as the threatened coastline)
(Diamond and Hausman, 1994). Thus, negative reactions associated
with a desire to punish offenderswhohave damaged a resourcemay in-
crease willingness to pay in contingent valuation surveys, while poten-
tially obscuring positive responses to the natural resource itself. A betterthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ments of environmental value.
Recent advances in neuroeconomics provide new options for mea-
suring both the process and outcomes of valuation. Neuroimaging
methods can confer advantages over more traditional measures of
choice by allowing investigators to visualize the dynamic contributions
of multiple decision components prior to choice, and also to verify
whether those components then inﬂuence choice (even on a trial-to-
trial basis). Mounting neuroimaging evidence suggests that affect (or
emotional processes involving arousal and valence) contributes to valu-
ation to a greater extent than previously suspected — not just with re-
spect to concrete outcomes (e.g., eating, drinking), but also abstract
outcomes (e.g., shopping and investing (Knutson and Greer, 2008;
Loewenstein et al., 2008)). While excessive affect can suboptimally
bias choice, some affect is required to inform even optimal choices
(Bechara et al., 1997; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005). Moreover, rather
than acting through a single channel, multiple affective mechanisms
(e.g., positive versus negative) may inﬂuence valuation (Knutson
et al., 2014). Thus, neuroeconomic theories and techniques might
allow researchers to deconstruct the different affective components
that promote valuation of environmental resources, as well as to assess
their relative impacts.
Accordingly, this research aimed to use behavioral and neuroimag-
ing techniques to identify and distinguish different affective processes
that inﬂuence environmental valuation. In behavioral and neuro-
imaging experiments, we speciﬁcally sought to test not only whether
positive affective responses to natural resources would inﬂuence will-
ingness to pay to protect those resources, but also whether negative af-
fective responses toward proposed destructive land uses would
increase willingness to pay. Further, we sought to explore whether
value integration responseswould reﬂect tradeoffs between positive re-
sponses to iconic natural resources and negative responses to destruc-
tive uses. To test these predictions in a behavioral experiment, we
independently manipulated the perceived iconicness of state and na-
tional parks (environmental public goods) and the destructiveness of
proposed uses of those sites and examined the impact of these variables
on affect and willingness to donate to preserve parks from proposed
uses.
In a subsequent neuroimaging experiment, based on an anticipatory
affect model (Knutson and Greer, 2008), we predicted that the
iconicness of the parks would increase self-reported positive arousal
and associated nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activity and increase dona-
tions, while the destructiveness of proposed land useswould instead in-
crease self-reported negative arousal and associated anterior insula
activity – but would also increase donations. We further predicted
that subjects might integrate these affective responses, weighing them
against the personal “cost” of donating, as reﬂected bymedial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC) activity (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014;
Knutson and Greer, 2008). We also sought to determine which
of these responses would most powerfully inﬂuence willingness to do-
nate. Finally, we examined whether individuals with stronger pro-
environmental attitudes (assessed with the revised New Ecological Par-
adigm (NEP) scale (Dunlap et al., 2000)) would donate more – either
due to increased positive affective responses toward iconic natural re-




To preselect affectively compelling stimuli for the donation task, we
conducted two pilot surveys of park lands (n= 36) and land uses (n=
29). In the ﬁrst survey, subjects rated photographs of national and state
parks' elicited affect (valence and arousal) and perceived iconicness
using seven-point (Likert) scales (Knutson et al., 2005). In a secondsurvey, subjects similarly rated proposed uses' elicited affect (valence
and arousal) and perceived destructiveness. Based on these ratings,
and with the goal of selecting iconic parks that elicited positive arousal
and destructive uses that elicited negative arousal, we selected 24
places (i.e., the 12 most iconic and the 12 least iconic) and 24 uses
(i.e., the 12most destructive and the 12 least destructive) to use as stim-
uli in the donation tasks.
Behavioral study
Subjects
Thirty-four healthy English-speaking adults whowere United States
residents participated in the behavioral study. Subjects had nohistory of
neurological or psychiatric disorders and gave informed consent for a
protocol approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Stanford
University School of Medicine. Two subjects were excluded for not
completing all trials and ratings, leaving a total of 32 subjects for analy-
sis (21 females, mean age 22± 6 years). Subjects received an initial en-
dowment of $24.00minus their donation to state or national parks (see
below) as well as $20.00 per hour for their time. The study was ap-
proved by the Institutional Review Board of the Stanford University
School of Medicine.
Donation task
Subjects were ﬁrst briefed on examples of current land use concerns
in state andnational park lands (e.g.,mining pressures around Yosemite
and the Grand Canyon, threatened closure of over a quarter of
California's state parks due to budget crises in 2012). They were in-
formed that while many of the scenarios they would see were con-
structed, they were representative of real concerns, and their
donations would actually aid state or national park lands (see below).
Subjects were asked to assume that the parks they sawwere potentially
under threat of closure, but that closure could be averted either by:
1) sufﬁcient donations or 2) selling 25% of the park to a third-party
buyer who would put the land toward a new use. They were also
asked to assume that the requested donation amount, in concert with
expected similar donations of others, should be sufﬁcient to avert the
sale and proposed land use. They then received a $24 cash endowment
from which they could choose to donate on each experimental trial.
They were notiﬁed that one of the trials would be randomly selected
at the end of the experiment to count “for real.” If they had decided to
donate on that trial, that requested amount would be subtracted from
their endowment and sent to their choice of the California State Parks
Foundation or National Park Foundation— otherwise they would retain
their entire endowment. Subjects were further instructed that since
only one decision would be enforced, they should treat each choice as
independent of the others, and not attempt to parcel out their endow-
ment across multiple trials. Thus, subjects made incentive compatible
decisions and no deception was necessary.
During the experiment, subjectswere presentedwith 72 trials in one
of two pseudorandomized orders (n = 16 subjects per stimulus order;
statistical comparison revealed no signiﬁcant differences between
these orders in resulting donations). In each trial, subjects ﬁrst saw a
park (e.g., Yosemite, picture plus name; 4 s), then a proposed use for a
quarter of the park (e.g., mining, picture plus name; 4 s), and then a re-
quest for a speciﬁc donation amount (e.g., $15) to help avert the pro-
posed use (by indicating “yes” or “no” in a laterally counterbalanced
position; 6 s; Fig. 1). The requested donation varied between $1 and
$18 to yield low ($1–6), medium ($7–12), and high ($13–18) donation
request amount categories for subsequent analysis. At the end of each
trial, subjects focused on a ﬁxation cross for a variable length of time
(2–6 s) until the onset of the next trial (see Fig. 1). The timing of events
within trials remained constant in order to ensure that peak neural ac-
tivity in response to presentation of each variable of interest (e.g., park
iconicness, land use destructiveness, requested donation amount)
could be identiﬁed, extracted, and averaged or used for trial-to-trial
Fig. 1.Donation task trial design. Trial structure included screens presenting a state or national park (4 s), a proposed use for a quarter of the park (4 s), a requested donation amount (4 s),
the decision period (6 s), and a variable ﬁxation interval (2–6 s; average trial length of 22 s).
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full design, a 2 (iconic versus non-iconic park) × 2 (destructive versus
non-destructive use) fully crossed factorial included 6 park and use
combinations per condition, and each of these was presented at the 3
different levels of requested donation (low, medium, and high). Stimuli
were presented and responses were recorded using E-Prime software
running on a personal computer.
At the end of the experiment, one of the trials was then randomly se-
lected and evaluated; if the subject had donated, that donation was
made to their choice of the California State Parks Foundation or the Na-
tional Park Foundation.
Post-task questionnaire
Immediately after the donation task (but before selection of a ran-
dom trial for incentive compatibility), subjects completed a question-
naire that assessed basic demographic information, affect ratings
(valence and arousal) for each place and use (both separately and
paired), perceived public beneﬁts and destructiveness of each proposed
use, and familiarity with each place (i.e., whether they had visited the
park before). Subjects also completed Dunlap's NEP scale (Dunlap
et al., 2000), which assesses individual differences in the endorsement
of pro-environmental attitudes. Subjects were also explicitly asked
about their level of environmental concern and involvement in pro-
environmental causes, how often they visited state and national parks
annually, and how much they donated to environmental charities
annually.
Affective valence and arousal ratings were transformed into positive
arousal (PA) and negative arousal (NA) scores, since positive arousal
and negative arousal have correlatedmost closelywith activity in neural
circuits of interest in previous research, and are thought to promote ap-
proach and avoidance behavior, respectively (Knutson and Greer,
2008). These transformations were performed by mean-deviating va-
lence and arousal ratings within subject and then applying a 45° rota-
tion to mean-deviated ratings (e.g., PA = arousal/√2 + valence/√2;




Twenty-eight healthy right-handed English-speaking adults partici-
pated in the neuroimaging study. Subjects had no history of neurologi-
cal or psychiatric disorders, anddid notmeet any of the typicalmagnetic
resonance exclusion criteria (e.g., currently taking psychotropic or car-
diac medications, metal in the body). Six subjects were excluded for ex-
cessive head motion (N2 mm from one brain acquisition to the next),
and two were excluded for not following instructions (i.e., not com-
pleting ratings), leaving a total of 20 subjects (12 females, mean age
26 ± 6 years) for the ﬁnal analysis. Subjects received their endowment
minus the amount they donated to state or national parks on arandomly selected trial (see above), as well as $20.00 per hour for
their time. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
of the Stanford University School of Medicine.
Donation task
The donation task used in the neuroimaging study was identical to
that used in the behavioral study, and used theﬁrst stimulus order. Sub-
ject responses were acquired through an FMRI-compatible response
box rather than a computer keyboard. Identical post-task question-
naires were also administered.
FMRI data acquisition and analysis
Images were acquired with a 3.0 T General Electric MRI scanner
using a thirty-two channel head coil. Forty-six 2.9 mm thick slices (in-
plane resolution 2.9 mm isotropic, no gap, interleaved acquisition) ex-
tended axially from the mid-pons to the crown of the skull, providing
whole-brain coverage and adequate spatial resolution of sub-cortical re-
gions of interest (e.g., midbrain, NAcc). Whole-brain functional scans
were acquired using a T2*-weighted gradient echo pulse sequence
(TR = 2 s, TE = 24 ms, ﬂip = 77°). High-resolution structural scans
were subsequently acquired with a T1-weighted pulse sequence
(TR = 7.2 ms, TE = 2.8 ms, ﬂip = 12°), to facilitate localization and
co-registration of functional data.
Neuroimaging data analyseswere conducted using Analysis of Func-
tional Neural Images (AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). For preprocessing,
voxel time series were sinc interpolated to correct for non-
simultaneous slice acquisition within each volume, concatenated across
runs, corrected for motion, slightly spatially smoothed to minimize
effects of anatomical variability (FWHM = 4 mm), high-pass ﬁltered
(admitting frequencies with period b 90 s), and normalized to percent
signal change with respect to voxel means over the entire task. Visual
inspection of motion correction estimates conﬁrmed that no subject's
head moved more than 2.0 mm in any dimension from one volume ac-
quisition to the next.
For whole brain analyses, regression models included thirteen re-
gressors of no interest: (1) six indexed residual motion; (2) two
indexed cerebrospinal ﬂuid intensity and white matter intensity
(Chang and Glover, 2009); (3) one indexed reaction time during pre-
sentation of the choice prompt (Knutson et al., 2005); and (4) four
modeled occurrence of each of the relevant trial periods (i.e., park pre-
sentation, use presentation, donation presentation, and choice prompt
presentation, with convolved boxcar functions as described below).
Three orthogonal regressors of interest then contrasted: (1) iconic
parks versus non-iconic parks during place presentation, (2) destructive
versus non-destructive uses duringuse presentation, and (3) lowversus
high requested donation amounts during requested amount presenta-
tion. Four orthogonal interactions of these contrasts were constructed
by multiplying the regressors of interest during presentation of all rele-
vant information (i.e., iconicness X destructiveness during land use pre-
sentation; iconicness X donation amount during requested amount
Fig. 2. Negative arousal statistically mediates the inﬂuence of destructive uses on choices
to donate in the behavioral study. A, Destructive land uses elicited more donations than
non-destructive land uses (T(2235) = 4.29, p b 0.001), and non-destructive uses for iconic
parks elicited more donations than non-destructive uses for non-iconic parks (T(1117) =
2.28, p = 0.023). B, Destructive land uses elicited higher negative arousal than non-de-
structive land uses (T(2300) = 11.92, p b 0.001). C, The indirect path from destructive use
to negative arousal to choice to donate was signiﬁcant, and including negative arousal de-
creased thedirect path coefﬁcient from0.045 (p b 0.001) to 0.007 (pN 0.05), indicating full
mediation (Z = 9.23, p b 0.001, index of mediation 0.076, 95% CI = [0.062, 0.092]).
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amount presentation; iconicness X destructiveness X donation amount
during requested amount presentation). Prior to inclusion in themodel,
these seven regressors of interestweremodeled as boxcar functions and
convolved with a single gamma-variate function that modeled a canon-
ical hemodynamic response (Cohen, 1997). Maps of t-statistics for re-
gressors of interest were transformed into Z-scores, coregistered with
structural maps, spatially normalized by warping to Talairach space,
and spatially resampled (to 3mmcubic voxels). Groupmaps were clus-
tered (cluster size N 10 contiguous 3 mm cubic voxels) and voxel-wise
thresholded (at p b 0.005, uncorrected) to yield a corrected whole
brain threshold (p b 0.05, corrected) for detecting activation (derived
using 10,000 Monte Carlo iterations on a resampled gray matter mask
with the AFNI program 3dClustSim).
For anatomically targeted analyses, volumes of interest were speci-
ﬁed in regions previously associated with anticipatory affect (Knutson
and Greer, 2008) and charitable giving (Harbaugh et al., 2007). Speciﬁ-
cally, spherical volumes of interest (8 mm in diameter) were placed in
bilateral foci in the NAcc (TC: ±10, 12,−2), anterior insula (TC: ±30,
1, 17), and medial prefrontal cortex (TC: ±4, 45, 0) where activity
was hypothesized to potentially predict choice. Activity (percent signal
change) was averaged across voxels within each volume of interest, ex-
tracted, and then averaged bilaterally to derive timecourses of activity.
Outliers that exceeded four standard deviations from mean activity
were deemed likely to reﬂect artifacts rather than signal and sowere ex-
cluded from analyses.
For prediction analyses, neural and behavioral data were entered
into logistic regressions to predict choices to donate on a trial-to-trial
basis (Knutson et al., 2007). Neural activity constituted peak percent
signal change (4 s lag, corrected for the hemodynamic response) in re-
gions of interest in response to the presentation of relevant information
(i.e., NAcc activity in response to park presentation, anterior insula and
MPFC activity in response to use presentation). Models that included
behavioral data also included rated positive arousal (or iconicness)
in response to places and negative arousal (or destructiveness) in
response to proposed uses. To examine whether behavioral
(i.e., affective) and neural data mediated the impact of iconicness and
destructiveness on decisions to donate, bootstrapped mediation analy-
ses were performed (Sobel, 1982).
Results
Stimulus selection
The stimulus selection pilot survey conﬁrmed that park iconicness
correlated positivelywith positive arousal (r=0.87, p b 0.001) but neg-
atively with negative arousal to a lesser extent (r =−0.61, p b 0.001),
while land use destructiveness correlated positively with negative
arousal (r = 0.97, p b 0.001) but negatively with positive arousal to a
lesser extent (r=−0.42, p b 0.001). Comparisons of correlated correla-
tions (using Williams-Hotelling t-tests) conﬁrmed that iconicness
correlated with positive arousal more robustly than destructiveness
(T = 6.46, p b .001), while destructiveness correlated with negative
arousal more robustly than iconicness (T = 8.97, p b .001). The 12
most iconic parks accordingly elicited greater positive arousal than the
12 least iconic parks (mean = 0.13 vs−0.12, SD = 0.39, p = 0.005),
while the 12 most destructive uses elicited greater negative arousal
than the 12 least destructive uses (mean = 1.04 vs−1.13, SD = 1.31,
p b 0.001). These stimuli were subsequently selected for use in behav-
ioral and neuroimaging studies.
Behavioral study
A hierarchical logistic regression modeled the inﬂuence of park
iconicness (high vs low), use destructiveness (high vs low), and
requested donation amount (high vs low) on the choice to donate(n = 32 subjects, modeled as random effects; Table A.1). Signiﬁcance
tests compared two models which differed only in terms of excluding
the factor of interest with a χ2 test with one degree of freedom (via
log likelihood) (Jaeger, 2008). This analysis indicated that subjects did
not donate signiﬁcantly more often when presented with high versus
low iconic parks (51.4% vs. 47.8%; χ2(1) = 0.07, p = 0.79), but did do-
nate signiﬁcantly more often when presented with high versus low de-
structive uses (54.1% vs. 45.1%; χ2(1) = 21.43, p b 0.001, Fig. 2A).
Consistent with incentive compatibility, subjects also donated less
often when asked to donate high versus low amounts (36.2% vs 65.3%;
χ2(1) = 132.15, p b 0.001).
A multiple regression further modeled the inﬂuence of individual
differences in demographic variables (including sex, pro-
environmental attitude, education, income, and annual visits to parks)
on subjects' likelihood of donating. This analysis revealed that of these
individual difference variables, only pro-environmental attitude
(assessed by the NEP scale) was associated with a greater likelihood of
donation (T(26) = 2.73, p = 0.011; bivariate r = .57, p b .001, Fig. A.2,
Table A.2). Another multiple regression modeled the association of av-
erage positive and negative arousal ratings of each park and proposed
Fig. 3. Negative arousal statistically mediates the inﬂuence of destructive land uses on
choices to donate in the neuroimaging study. A, Destructive land uses elicitedmore dona-
tions thannon-destructive uses (T(1371)=15.58, p b 0.001), and destructive uses for iconic
parks elicited more donations than non-destructive uses for non-iconic parks (T(698) =
4.03, p b 0.001). B, Destructive uses elicited higher negative arousal than non-destructive
uses (T(1317)= 30.45, p b 0.001). Non-destructive uses for iconic parks elicited higher neg-
ative arousal than non-destructive uses for non-iconic parks (T(712) = 3.27, p = 0.001).
C, Negative arousal partially mediated the inﬂuence of destructive proposed uses on
choice to donate. The indirect path from destructive land use to negative arousal to dona-
tion decision was signiﬁcant, and inclusion of negative arousal decreased the direct path
coefﬁcient from 0.19 to 0.11, indicating partial mediation (Z = 7.5, p b 0.001, index of
mediation = 0.151, 95% CI = [0.113, 0.189]).
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variables, only negative arousal in response to proposed land uses sig-
niﬁcantly predicted donation rates (T(19) = 3.75, p = 0.001).
Bootstrapped mediation analyses were conducted to determine
whether positive arousal or negative arousal could mediate the inﬂu-
ence of park iconicness or use destructiveness on likelihood of donation.
A distribution of the mediated (or indirect) effect, calculated as the
product of the paths from the independent variable to the mediator
and from the mediator to the dependent variable, was derived over
1000 iterations of data sampled with replacement. Reported p-values
were calculated as the proportion of the distribution that exceeded 0.
These analyses revealed that negative arousal signiﬁcantly mediated
the effect of use destructiveness on donations (Fig. 2C). A signiﬁcant in-
direct path existed from the rated land use destructiveness to negative
arousal (p b 0.001, T = 12.34), and the direct path coefﬁcient from
land use destructiveness to donation likelihood was reduced to non-
signiﬁcance after including negative arousal as a mediator (e.g., from
0.05 to 0.01, p b 0.001, Z = 9.23, index of mediation = 0.076, 95% con-
ﬁdence interval = [0.062, 0.092], Fig. 2C), indicating full mediation.
Since park iconicness was not signiﬁcantly associated with donations
in this sample, analyses could not test whether positive arousal mediat-
ed the inﬂuence of iconicness on donations.
Together, these analyses suggested that the destructiveness of the
proposed land use increased donations, and that this increase depended
on negative arousal evoked by the proposed use. Power analyses
(power = 0.80, p b 0.05, two-tailed) indicated that a minimum of
eight subjects would be needed to replicate this behavioral effect in a
subsequent neuroimaging study (Z = 4.65, Table A.1). Beyond
supporting the power analysis, these ﬁndings also suggested that pre-
dictions might focus on neural targets associated with negative arousal,
such as the anterior insula.
Neuroimaging study
Affect and donation
As in the behavioral study, in the neuroimaging study, place
iconicness robustly correlated with positive arousal (r = 0.50, p b
0.001), while use destructiveness robustly correlated with negative
arousal (r = 0.62, p b 0.001). A hierarchical logistic regression modeled
the inﬂuence of park iconicness (high vs low), use destructiveness (high
vs low), requested donation amount (low vs high), and their interac-
tions on the choice to donate (n = 20 subjects, modeled as random ef-
fects). In the neuroimaging sample, subjects donated more when
presented with highly iconic parks (63.0% vs. 54.1%; χ2(1) = 12.21,
p b 0.001), as well as when presented with destructive versus non-
destructive land uses (77.5% vs. 39.7%; χ2(1) = 211.55, p b 0.001,
Fig. 3A). Subjects donated less when asked to donate higher versus
lower requested amounts (48.6% vs. 72.65%; χ2(1) = 158.19, p b
0.001). Supplementary analyses conﬁrmed that while park iconicness,
use destructiveness, and requested amount signiﬁcantly inﬂuencedper-
centage donations, this pattern of inﬂuence could not be attributed to
changes in deliberation, since only requested amount inﬂuenced reac-
tion time (Fig. A.1).
Bootstrapped mediation analyses identical to those applied in the
behavioral study again indicated that negative arousal partially mediat-
ed the inﬂuence of use destructiveness on donations (0.18 to 0.11, Z =
7.5, p b 0.001, index of mediation = 0.151, 95% CI = [0.113, 0.189],
Fig. 3C). Positive arousal, however, did notmediate the signiﬁcant effect
of park iconicness on donations. Average negative arousal ratings to-
ward different combinations of park and proposed usewere strongly as-
sociated with donation likelihood (n = 24; r = 0.83, p b 0.001).
Whole brain activity
Whole brain analyses tested the impact of park iconicness, use de-
structiveness, and requested amount on neural activity. We predicted
that iconic versus non-iconic parks would increase activity in regionsassociated with positive arousal (e.g., the nucleus accumbens), as well
as regions associated with viewing recognizable scenes
(parahippocampal gyrus and fusiform gyrus). We further predicted
that destructive versus non-destructive uses would increase activity in
regions associatedwith negative arousal (e.g., the anterior insula). Final-
ly, we predicted that the interaction of park iconicness by use destruc-
tiveness would activate regions implicated in value integration
(e.g., the medial prefrontal cortex, or MPFC) (Knutson et al., 2007).
As predicted, whole-brain analyses revealed that viewing iconic ver-
sus non-iconic parks increased activity in the nucleus accumbens (small
volume corrected) as well as the parahippocampal and fusiform
gyri, along with other regions (Table A.4). Destructive versus non-
destructive proposed land uses elicited increased activity in the anterior
insula, along with other regions (Table A.4, Fig. 4). The interaction of
park iconicness with use destructiveness correlated with activity in
the MPFC (small volume corrected, Table A.4, Fig. 4). Though not pre-
dicted, the interaction of park iconicness with use destructiveness also
correlated with activity in regions commonly associated with
Fig. 4. Volume of interest activity varies by condition. Groupmap of neural activity (middle column) for the anterior insula is cluster-corrected at p b 0.05, while maps of NAcc and MPFC
activity are small-volume corrected at p b 0.005. All bar charts depict activity peaks in predicted bilateral volumes of interest. First column: During park presentation (top), NAcc
activity (middle) by condition (bottom). Iconic parks in black andnon-iconic in gray; Y-axis: percent signal change; error bars:±SEM. NAcc activity trended toward increasing in response
to iconic versus non-iconic parks (T(1421)=1.63, p=0.10). Second column:During landuse presentation (top), anterior insula activity (middle) displayedby condition (bottom). Anterior
insula activity increased in response to destructive versus non-destructive uses (T(1428) = 2.27, p = 0.02). Third column: During land use presentation (top), medial prefrontal cortex
activity (middle) displayed by condition (bottom). MPFC activity increased when non-destructive (rather than destructive) uses were proposed for non-iconic parks (T(714) = 2.28,
p = 0.02).
Table 1



























Log likelihood −673.1 −851.7 −669.9
Nagelkerke R2 0.44 0.19 0.45
AIC 1356.20 1713.45 1355.98
Z-scores with coefﬁcients and SEMs in parentheses. Regressions include subject random
effects. ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001; ⁎⁎ p b 0.01; ⁎ p b 0.05.
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tion, posterior superior temporal sulcus, and middle temporal gyrus;
Table A.4). The full interaction of park iconicness, use destructiveness,
and amount requested did not elicit correlated activity in any of the pre-
dicted regions, and the main effects of all of the three variables also did
not overlap in any of the predicted regions (Table A.4).
Volume of interest activity
Activity time courses were extracted from anatomically targeted
volumes of interest to verify differences in peak activity (i.e., at a 4 s
lag) across conditions. NAcc activity was greater in response to presen-
tation of iconic versus non-iconic parks (Peak TC =−4, 11,−1, Z =
3.49, 4 voxels, small-volume correction, Fig. 4), while anterior insula ac-
tivity was greater in response to presentation of destructive versus non-
destructive uses (Peak TC = −30, 1, 17, Z = 4.05, 21 voxels; Fig. 4).
MPFC activity was reduced in response to presentation of destructive
versus non-destructive uses, and speciﬁcally showed increased activity
for non-destructive versus destructive proposed uses of non-iconic
parks (Peak TC = 7, 45, 6, Z = 3.27, 6 voxels, small volume correction;
Fig. 4).
Trial-based neural prediction of choice
Beyond responding to presented stimuli, we predicted that NAcc ac-
tivity in response to iconic parks and anterior insula activity in response
to destructive uses might predict choices to donate on a trial-to-trial
basis. These speciﬁc predictions were tested by a set of hierarchicallogistic regression analyses in which behavioral (i.e., park iconicness,
use destructiveness, requested amount), neural (i.e., NAcc activity, ante-
rior insula activity, MPFC activity), and combined variables predicted
choices to donate (n = 20 subjects, modeled as random effects;
Table 1). In the behavioral model, presentation of iconic versus non-
iconic parks increased donations (Z = 4.22, p b 0.001), as did
93N. Sawe, B. Knutson / NeuroImage 122 (2015) 87–95presentation of destructive versus non-destructive uses (Z= 15.07, p b
0.001), and high versus low donation requests decreased donations
(Z=−8.89, p b 0.001). In the neural model, bilateral anterior insula ac-
tivity positively predicted donation (Z = 2.11, p = 0.035), whereas bi-
lateral MPFC activity negatively predicted donation (Z =−2.87, p =
0.004). In a combined model, behavioral variables continued to predict
donation, and MPFC activity continued to negatively predict donation
(Z =−2.42, p = 0.015; Table 1). The combined model accounted for
slightly more variance and had an improved model ﬁt than the behav-
ioral model, as evidenced by a higher R2 and lower Akaike Information
Criterion, suggesting that the data were not being overﬁt (Table 1).
The similar AICs of these models, however, suggested that one did not
clearly dominate the other (Dziak et al., 2012; Jansen and Stam, 1994).
Because the interaction of iconic parks and destructive uses also cor-
related with activity in a number of brain regions implicated in social
cognition and moral judgment in previous research (Table A.4), we ad-
ditionally performed a supplementary (i.e., post hoc) regression analysis
that included peak activity extracted from these regions (i.e., posterior
superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction, andmiddle tempo-
ral gyrus; Table A.5). Though activity in these regions correlated with
task variables, their activity did not predict donations, and adding
them to the combinedmodel increased its AIC relative to the behavioral
model, suggesting a poorer ﬁt to the data.
Individual differences in pro-environmental attitudes
Findings from the behavioral study suggested that individual differ-
ences in pro-environmental attitudes increased donations by inciting
negative arousal. Therefore, in the neuroimaging study, we investigated
whether individuals who rated high in pro-environmental attitudes
would show greater anterior insula activity in response to proposed
destructive uses. As predicted, whole brain regression analyses of envi-
ronmental attitudes on the contrast of whole brain responses to presen-
tation of destructive versus non-destructive uses indicated that
individuals who endorsed more pro-environmental attitudes, as
assessed by the NEP scale (Dunlap et al., 2000), showed greater anterior
insula activity in response to destructive proposed land uses (alongwith
greater anterior cingulate activity; Fig. A.3, Table 2).
Discussion
This research sought to use neuroeconomic models and methods to
examine how people value environmental resources. Together, the
ﬁndings provide initial evidence that neural measures can illuminate
distinct affective processes that contribute to the valuation of environ-
mental resources. Speciﬁcally, while iconic parks elicited positive
arousal and nucleus accumbens activity (small volume-corrected), de-
structive proposed land uses elicited negative arousal and anterior
insula activity, and the interaction of these factors additionally elicited
medial prefrontal cortex activity. Of these responses, anterior insula ac-
tivity and negative arousal toward destructive uses predicted choices to
donate. These ﬁndings are consistent with concerns that in contingent
valuation estimates, negative emotional responses toward the destruc-
tive actions of others may sometimes eclipse the impact of positive
emotional responses toward the natural resources themselves. Further,
individuals with stronger pro-environmental attitudes showed greater
anterior insula activity in response to proposed destructive land uses.Table 2
Differential neural responses in pro-environmental individuals to destructive uses.
Region X Y Z Z-score Voxels
L insula −28 25 13 4.49 15
R anterior cingulate 10 −14 32 4.06 12
L insula −28 −9 17 3.33 12
n = 20; voxelwise p b 0.005 uncorrected, cluster corrected p b 0.05, minimum cluster
size = 10 3 mm cubic contiguous voxels; x = right; y = anterior; z = superior, bold
indicates activation of predicted regions.The ability of destructive uses not only to elicit negative emotional re-
sponses, but also to motivate donations to prevent those uses, coheres
with an account in which perceived violations of “protected values”
powerfully motivate individuals to act (Baron and Spranca, 1997).
These negative affective reactions, however, may also bias responses
to surveymeasures intended to elicit an accurate valuation of the intrin-
sic value of environmental resources (Kahneman et al., 1999).
These ﬁndings suggest a novel role for negative arousal and anterior
insula activity in driving donation behavior. While iconic parks in-
creased activity in regions associated with positive arousal such as the
nucleus accumbens (NAcc; but only at a small volume-corrected thresh-
old) (Knutson and Greer, 2008) along with circuits associated with
place identiﬁcation such as the parahippocampal place area (Epstein
et al., 1999), this activity did not signiﬁcantly predict increased dona-
tions. Positive arousal in response to iconic parkswasmore pronounced
in the neuroimaging sample, perhaps due to slightly stronger endorse-
ment of pro-environmental attitudes (p = .05), but more extensive re-
search is needed to conclusively identify the individual differences
associated with positive responses to environmental resources. Al-
though other research has found that NAcc activity and positive arousal
can promote donations to orphans (Genevsky et al., 2013), in the cur-
rent case of environmental valuation, negative arousal and insular activ-
ity evoked by threatening proposed land uses overshadowed any
positive arousal evoked by iconic locales or any “warm glow” associated
with charitable giving (Andreoni, 1990; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Moll
et al., 2006).
Activity in brain regions associatedwith cost-beneﬁt integration like
the medial prefrontal cortex (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Knutson et al.,
2007) correlated with the interaction of park iconicness and use de-
structiveness. Interestingly in this context, rather than positively
predicting donations, MPFC activity predicted withholding donations.
Thus, MPFC activity may have tracked personal rather than communal
beneﬁts and costs in the current donation task, since donation requests
were framed as prices to be paid, which could prime personal over pub-
lic considerations. Indeed, in neuroimaging studies of purchasing, when
subjects are presented with prices, higher prices typically decrease
MPFC activity, since they represent a cost rather than a beneﬁt to sub-
jects (Knutson et al., 2008). Thisﬁnding is also consistentwith literature
implicating MPFC activity in integrating personal gains (Knutson et al.,
2003) with self-relevant information (Amodio et al., 2007; Kelley
et al., 2002; Northoff et al., 2006). By alternative accounts, MPFC activity
might reﬂect uncertainty or conﬂict during choice (particularly in more
dorsal regions highlighted in thewhole brain analysis; DeMartino et al.,
2013; Rushworth et al., 2011; Shenhav et al., 2013). In the current re-
search, however, while rates of donation signiﬁcantly and systematical-
ly varied as a function of park iconicness and use destructiveness,
reaction time (thought to behaviorally index uncertainty and choice
conﬂict) did not (see Fig. A.1). Further, inclusion of reaction time as a co-
variate in neuroimaging analyses did not diminish the interactive inﬂu-
ence of iconicness anddestructiveness onMPFC activity. IfMPFC activity
does reﬂect value integration, however, its lack of further association
with requested amount poses a puzzle. When considering requested
donations, subjects may have adopted more of a rule-based strategy
by setting a maximum acceptable amount, and subsequently refusing
to donatemore than that amount. Implementation of such a “threshold”
rule might correspond with the observation that higher requested do-
nations increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Table A.4). Such an interpretation,while clearly not predicted, deserves
exploration in future research. These neural ﬁndings nonetheless sug-
gest that an anticipatory affect account of environmental valuation
might help researchers to identify potential motivational conﬂicts that
are difﬁcult to disentangle with traditional assessments.
Several ﬁndings suggest that proposed destructive uses may pro-
voke perceived norm violations and negative arousal, adding to a grow-
ing literature on emotional contributions to moral judgment (Greene
and Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001). First, destructive land uses
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with negative reactions to norm violations in the context of social ex-
change (Sanfey, 2007). Second, the combination of place iconicness
and land use destructiveness elicited correlated activity not only in the
MPFC, but also in a network of regions implicated in social inference
and moral judgment (including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ),
posterior superior temporal sulcus, and middle temporal gyrus)
(Bahnemann et al., 2010; Berns et al., 2012; Fumagalli and Priori,
2012). Activity in these regions, however, did not predict increased do-
nations to offset destructive land uses.
In a previous study of “sacred values,” betraying one's own strongly
held convictions in exchange for sufﬁcient payment increased activity in
circuits associated with perspective taking (e.g., left temporoparietal
junction and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) (Berns et al., 2012). The in-
vestigators inferred that personal norm violations might recruit neural
circuits associated with rule-based (or deontological) rather than emo-
tional (or utilitarian) concerns. In the current research, however, activ-
ity in circuits associated with affective responses rather than
perspective-taking predicted donations. Thus, in the context of environ-
mental valuation, affective aswell as cognitive processesmay powerful-
ly inﬂuence individuals' willingness to act to right others' perceived
wrongs. During scanning, subjects' neural activity promoted actions
that supported their convictions, and this effect was most pronounced
in individuals who strongly endorsed pro-environmental attitudes.
Similarly, in other studies, individuals who supported egalitarian values
showed the strongest insular responses to others' moral infractions
(Dawes et al., 2012). Outrage and associated insula activity in response
to proposed destructive land uses thus might have encouraged further
processing in circuits associated with moral judgments. Concerns
about norm violations, however, might divert attention away from the
evaluation of natural resources toward consideration of land use ethics.
Neural measures might eventually provide researchers with addi-
tional tools to supplement the “willingness to pay”measures tradition-
ally used in contingent valuation surveys. By specifying demographic
and psychological variables that inﬂuence valuation of environmental
resources, neural evidence could guide policy analysts to evaluate will-
ingness to pay in multiple scenarios, potentially providingmore precise
estimates of the welfare and distributional impacts of different policies.
Future work will necessarily need to reﬁne neural measures to deter-
mine whether they can add to existing behavioral measures. Beyond
contingent valuationmethods, neuralmeasuresmight also complement
other environmental valuation metrics, such as the travel cost method,
which estimates the value of a place based on the travel costs that visi-
tors are willing to pay to visit the resource. For instance, different land-
scape modiﬁcations might imply differential losses across individuals,
which would be difﬁcult to estimate from travel cost alone, but still
might be reﬂected in neurobehavioral measures.
While this research takes an initial step toward identifying neural
antecedents of environmental valuation, a number of questions remain
ripe for further exploration. First, presenting in-depth surveys in the
style of contingent valuation methods presents a neuroimaging chal-
lenge, since FMRI experiments require presentation of repeated trials
with precisely controlled delivery of information. Future research, how-
ever, could draw more explicit and quantitative comparisons between
reactions elicited during neuroimaging experiments and those mea-
sured in surveys. Second, the present study did not allow subjects to
opt out or answer with “protest zeros” if they were repulsed by the
mere notion of putting a price on an environmental resource. Allowing
opt-outs could provide a distinct category of responses that might be
predicted either by more extreme or different patterns of neural activi-
ty, and which might even more closely track moral outrage elicited in
the context of contingent valuation surveys. Third, presented options
might focus exclusively on natural resources currently under threat of
destructive land uses, rather than mixing in hypothetical proposed
land uses, as in the current study. At the time the study was conducted,
a fourth of California's State Parks faced imminent threat of closure dueto budgetary shortfalls (a fate which was later averted). The budgetary
crisis stimulated a public discussion of alternative uses and privatized
funding models for park lands, which motivated the study's scenarios.
But the present methods could extend to actual future environmental
proposals in order to explore links between the reactions of neural
“focus groups” and aggregate policy responses (Ariely and Berns,
2010; Falk et al., 2012). Fourth, loss aversion might inﬂate individuals'
willingness to pay when considering future versus past destructive
land uses. Thus, requests for donations to prevent damaging land uses
could be compared with donations to restore already-damaged re-
sources. Exploring the inﬂuence of thesemethodological and situational
variables may facilitate the design of measures that can capture more
precise estimates of the intrinsic value of natural resources.
The increasing popularity of ecosystem service approaches to envi-
ronmental valuation highlights a growing need for economic assess-
ments of the intangible beneﬁts of natural resources. The quest for
valid and reliable estimates of environmental value through stated pref-
erences (e.g., contingent valuation surveys) has proven challenging.
Neuroimaging techniques may eventually inform environmental policy
analysis by clarifying how individuals respond to various aspects of val-
uation tasks, as well as by elucidating the potential inﬂuences of con-
founds and individual differences. Rather than viewing subjective
reactions to natural resources as misleading, deconstructing affective
contributions to valuation may eventually reveal clearer estimates of
nature's inherent value to humanity.
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